Amendments to the Nuclear Liability Law
The Indian government, through Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman, has expressed intentions to amend the Atomic Energy Act and the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act. This move is perceived as a response to U.S. pressure to reduce nuclear manufacturers' liability in case of accidents. However, it raises concerns in India regarding nuclear safety and financial implications.
Risks and Responsibilities
- All nuclear reactors inherently carry accident risks, with potential widespread consequences for victims, operators, and suppliers.
- The Supreme Court of India had previously established absolute liability for hazardous activities, a principle diluted in the 2010 nuclear liability law.
- The law caps operator liability at ₹1,500 crore, which is minimal compared to potential damages.
- Examples include the Fukushima disaster cleanup costs estimated between ¥35 trillion to ¥80 trillion, highlighting the inadequacy of India's liability cap.
Right of Recourse
The law includes a "right of recourse" clause, allowing operators to seek compensation from suppliers if defects cause an accident. This is a rare provision, often missing in liability laws of other countries influenced by powerful nuclear corporations.
Design Defects and Indemnity
- Previous nuclear accidents have shown that design defects can be pivotal, as seen in Fukushima and Three Mile Island incidents.
- Indemnity for suppliers removes economic incentives for safety, evidenced by historical negligence in addressing known safety issues.
- Efforts to dilute the right of recourse have been made by previous and current Indian governments, favoring nuclear suppliers over victims.
Economic Implications and Supplier Concerns
- U.S. suppliers are apprehensive about legal exposure in India, fearing future liability increases and the risk of criminal accountability.
- The AP1000 reactor design, proposed for India, has a troubled financial track record, with significant cost overruns and abandoned projects in the U.S.
- Despite claims of safety by suppliers, the financial risks they avoid indicate a recognition of potential accident threats.
Political Dynamics
There is ongoing political pressure and lobbying from U.S. officials on behalf of nuclear corporations, aiming to amend India's liability laws. Despite these efforts, no U.S. reactors have been sold to India since the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement, which may have averted economically detrimental decisions for India.
Conclusion
The proposed amendments to the liability law reflect broader geopolitical and corporate pressures. However, they raise critical questions about prioritizing corporate interests over public safety and financial prudence in India's nuclear energy strategy.